Limiter la budgétarisation des banques centrales

Stephen Cecchetti and Kermit Schoenholtz

Revue d'économie financière, 2021, vol. N° 144, issue 4, 147-160

Abstract: Since 2007, and especially during the Covid pandemic, central banks have expanded both the scope and scale of their interventions in unprecedented fashion, blurring the lines between monetary and fiscal policy. This fiscalisation endangers central bank independence, thereby weakening monetary policymakers' ability to deliver on their mandates for price and financial stability. To find a way back to the pre-2008 division of responsibilities, governments must establish clearer limits on what central banks can and cannot do. To limit fiscalisation, authorities can do two things: commit to structural distinctions between fiscal and monetary policy, and articulate a balance sheet reaction function (analogous to a policy interest rate reaction function) that includes the reversal of crisis interventions when market functionality is restored. Having engaged in fiscalisation more than once, either by choice or by circumstance, central banks need to establish a framework that prevents repetition. Classification JEL: E40, E50, E52, E58, E60

JEL-codes: E40 E50 E52 E58 E60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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