La Banque centrale européenne: quelle responsabilité devant le Parlement européen, corollaire de son indépendance pour assoir sa crédibilité et sa légitimité ?

Pervenche Berès

Revue d'économie financière, 2021, vol. N° 144, issue 4, 227-245

Abstract: The development of monetary policy and the role of the ECB after 2007 reopen the debate on the conditions and modalities of its democratic accountability to the European Parliament. It was built from 1998 on the basis of the Maastricht Treaty; it has evolved in parallel with the institutional development of the ECB's responsibilities, but the rise of unconventional monetary policy, its side effects and the broadening of the interpretation of its mandate raise new questions. Classification JEL: E40, E50, E52, E58, E60

JEL-codes: E40 E50 E52 E58 E60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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