Le sport aux enchères: la malédiction du vainqueur

Wladimir Andreff

Revue d'économie financière, 2024, vol. N° 154, issue 2, 17-27

Abstract: Sports organizations that hold monopolies (monopsonies) maximize their rent by imposing auctions on their customers (suppliers). The latter suffer from the curse of the auction winner and overpay. This process plays out when: (1) major international sporting events are awarded and candidate cities are encouraged to outbid each other; (2) team owners of North American sports leagues have potential host cities bid for their franchises; (3) TV broadcasting rights are auctioned off among competing networks; (4) acquiring superstar players in the arms race between the richest sports teams. JEL classification:

Keywords: D42; D44; Z20; Z22; Z23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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