Sélection d'équilibre par l'information incomplète

Olivier Tercieux

Revue d'économie industrielle, 2006, vol. n° 114-115, issue 2, 5-5

Abstract: Several recent papers show that by introducing a slight departure from the standard assumption that payoffs of a game are common knowldege, it is possible that a unique equilibrium arises. In this survey paper, we try to understand the underlying mechansims of this literature. We focus on a main example that will allow us to divide our analysis into two parts: the study of the information structure and the study of the payoff structure. We also discuss different possible relaxation of the assumption that payoffs are common knowledge. Finally, we provide some insights on the type of equilibrium that is selected with this approach.

Keywords: Imcomplete Information; Risk-dominance; Higher Order Uncertainty; Robutness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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