Incertitude stratégique et sélection d'équilibre: deux applications

Jean-Marc Tallon

Revue d'économie industrielle, 2006, vol. n° 114-115, issue 2, 6-6

Abstract: Global games have the interesting feature that expectations are somehow anchored on real, exogenous, variables. One can thus keep at the same time the self fulfilling aspect of expectations, while restoring uniqueness of equilibrium. This enhances the predictive power of the model. We illustrate this mechanism through two examples. The first one studies the residential choice of agents that have racial preferences. The second deals with the contagion of bank runs from one country to another.

Keywords: Contagion; Beliefs; Residential Choice; Bank Run. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Working Paper: Incertitude stratégique et sélection d'équilibre: deux applications (2006)
Working Paper: Incertitude stratégique et sélection d'équilibre: deux applications (2006)
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