Comportements adaptatifs sans croyances

Sylvain Béal and Jacques Durieu

Revue d'économie industrielle, 2006, vol. n° 114-115, issue 2, 7-7

Abstract: In this paper, we consider situations where agents face repeatedly the same decision problem. We focus on adaptive rules without beliefs. We distinguish between two kinds of models. Firstly, we study adaptive rules that are only based on private information. Decisions are made on the basis of past payoffs. Moreover, some of these models incorporate an aspiration level : the agent compares the payoff which he receives to this aspiration level. Secondly, we present adaptive rules that take into account information about other agents. Each agent observes the actions of others and makes a decision via imitation. Various imitations rules are investigated and discussed.Adaptation, renforcement, seuil d?aspiration, imitation.

Keywords: Evolution; Fictitious Play; Imitation; Game Theory; Stochastic Stability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=REI_114_0007 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-industrielle-2006-2-page-7.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:reidbu:rei_114_0007

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue d'économie industrielle from De Boeck Université
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().