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Le critère de stabilité stochastique en théorie des jeux évolutionnaires

Richard Baron and Philippe Solal

Revue d'économie industrielle, 2006, vol. n° 114-115, issue 2, 8-8

Abstract: This paper presents results on stochastic stability in evolutionary game theory. We will see that imitation processes with bounded memory and sampling (Josephson, Matros, 2004) select Pareto outcomes whereas Fictitious Play processes with bounded memory select risk-dominant outcomes in the sense of Morris, Rob and Shin (1995). In order to consider the full class of finite games, we present generalization of these results from point-valued concepts to set-valued concepts.

Keywords: Evolution; Fictitious Play; Imitation; Game Theory; Stochastic Stability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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