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Coordination stratégique et connaissance commune dans les réseaux de communication

Jeanne Hagenbach and Frederic Koessler

Revue d'économie industrielle, 2006, vol. n° 114-115, issue 2, 10-10

Abstract: Based on the work of Chwe (1999, 2000), we study how communication networks influence the diffusion of information and decision making in a class of coordination games under incomplete information. This framework can be used, for example, to analyze the diffusion of a new technology standard when potential users do not know others?preferences and information. In the static version of the model, we characterize minimal sufficient networks for the emergence of the new technology, and we illustrate the role of interactive knowledge for the coordination of agents?actions. In the dynamic version of the model, we study how the speed of adoption varies with agents?preferences and the structure of the communication network.

Keywords: Collective Action; Common Knowledge; Coordination; Games of Incomplete Information; Social Networks; Technology Standards; Communication Structure. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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