Enveloppe Soleau et droit de possession antérieure: définition et analyse économique

Julien Pénin ()

Revue d'économie industrielle, 2008, vol. n° 121, issue 1, 85-102

Abstract: In France patents go to the first to file the patent application and not to the first to invent. Yet, this system is combined with a rule of prior user right that grants to first inventors the right to continue to use and commercialise their invention although it has been patented by another organisation. The recourse to « enveloppes Soleau » allows therefore first inventors to date their invention and eventually to claim a first user right in the future. This paper discusses the economic implications of this rule with respect both to incentives to invest in R&D and to incentives to disclose knowledge. We specifically insist on the complementarity between strategies of patent and « enveloppes Soleau ».

Keywords: Patent; Intellectual Property Rights; French System of Innovation; Secrecy; Incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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