Tarification binomiale du monopsone

François Contensou

Revue d'économie industrielle, 2008, vol. n° 122, issue 2, 45-65

Abstract: In relation with the current balance of power between producers and retailing concerns in France, the text at hand focuses on the general properties of two-part tariffs set by a monopsony, especially when discrimination is ruled out. This problem is not similar to the monopoly case, since a buyer controls more variables (quantities) than a seller. It is shown that for more than two producers, non discriminating two-part tariffs do not preclude residual profits for some of them. In some instances the buyer keeps discretionary power, arbitrarily controlling the residual profits of some subsets of suppliers.

Keywords: Two-part tariffs; Monopsony (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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