Théorie de l'agence et concessions de chemins de fer français au 19ème siècle

Guy Numa

Revue d'économie industrielle, 2009, vol. n° 125, issue 1, 105-128

Abstract: This article examines the railway concessions in France in the 19th century as examples of a principal-agent relationship between the State and a contractor. I show that one of the main assumptions of the agency theory, the asymmetric information at the benefit of the agent, is not verified. I also present a new approach by defining the interest guarantee as a specific sort of risk sharing that diminishes the effort incentive. While the principal-agent model predicts increased effort on the part of the agent under conditions of risk sharing, I demonstrate that railway companies made less effort to efficiently manage their operations. Therefore, I suggest that agency theory does not account for the efficiency and the function of 19th century railway concessions in France. After briefly retracing the history of these concessions, I introduce the theoretical framework of the principal-agent model then I apply it to the particular case of the French railway concessions.

Keywords: Agency Relationship; Agency Theory; Concessions; Railways; Risk Sharing; Asymmetric Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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