Investissement et financement dans un monopole avec bénéfices privés
Jacques Thépot
Revue d'économie industrielle, 2015, vol. n° 149, issue 1, 149-168
Abstract:
?This article examines the impact of private benefits on investment and financing decisions in a monopoly. Originally a 100 % shareholder, its manager must decide both the amount of capital sold to an outside investor and / or the loan he makes to finance an investment in capacity. We study how to combine these two sources of funding when the manager extracts private benefits that increase the cost of production. We show that borrowing indirectly becomes a prime source of funding for these private benefits?
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:reidbu:rei_149_0149
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