‪L’ouverture de l’amont pétrolier à des compagnies privées‪. Un cadre d’analyse en termes d’économie des coûts de transaction

Sylvain Rossiaud

Revue d'économie industrielle, 2015, vol. n° 150, issue 2, 111-141

Abstract: ?By drawing on transaction cost economics, this article identifies the coordination problems and contractual hazards resulting from the upstream oil transaction between oil states and private companies. ? It contributes to a better understanding of the different functions of a national oil company in the governance of transaction. Public companies can complement or replace coordination through contractual arrangements. We therefore propose and discuss the idea that the functional effectiveness of an oil governance structure depends on the consistency between the place of the public company in this structure and the state?s capacity to ensure effective regulation through contracts.

Keywords: Transaction Costs Economics; Oil Governance Structure; Oil Contracts; National Oil Companies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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