‪Brevet et innovation: comment restaurer l’efficience dynamique des brevets ?‪

Christian Le Bas and Julien Pénin ()

Revue d'économie industrielle, 2015, vol. n° 151, issue 3, 127-160

Abstract: ?The main rationale of the patent system is based on its dynamic efficiency. ? By providing firms with incentives to invest in R&D and to disclose their knowledge, patents encourage innovation and increase social welfare in the long run. In this work, which reviews the most recent literature on patents, we show that patents can have a significant negative impact on the dynamics of innovation. We show that this is not due to the intrinsic properties of the patent system but to some of its recent evolutions that mean that, nowadays, too many patents are granted in some industries and that patent information is bad. The combination of those two elements explains most of the problems induced by modern patent systems such as hold up (patent trolls), anticommons (royalty stacking), and high transaction costs in markets for technology. We conclude by discussing patent reforms that could solve those problems and ensure that the patent system once again becomes an instrument of dynamic efficiency.

Keywords: Markets for Technology; Patent; Incentives; Innovation Policy; Hold up; Trolls; Anti-Commons (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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