‪Enchérir ou négocier: quelle forme préférable de marché ?‪

Sylvain Mignot and Annick Vignes ()

Revue d'économie industrielle, 2016, vol. n° 153, issue 1, 123-153

Abstract: ?On some particular markets, people have the choice to sell (or buy) their merchandise through pairwise transactions or auctions. Each agent can use a market design one day and the other design the other day. From the empirical study of the Boulogne-sur-Mer fish market, we show that, at a macro level, this organization is a stable one, significant quantities being traded on each sub-market every day. At a micro-level, it appears that agents have different strategies, some of them being mostly loyal to a particular mechanism when some others regularly switch. A third important result is that the most expensive species of fish are selling at a higher price through negotiation when the cheapest ones are sold at higher prices through auctions. This article then presents an agent-based model which help to understand under which conditions this particular organization is a stable one. ?

Keywords: Social Networks; Fish Market; Price Dispersion; Micro Data Analysis; Agent-Based Modelling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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