 Is ride-hailing doomed to monopoly? Theory and evidence from the main U.S. marketsRevue d'économie industrielle, 2018, vol. n° 162, issue 2, 43-72 Abstract: ?This paper shows that the irruption of digital platforms is creating winner-takes-all dynamics in ride-hailing markets. We argue that ride-hailing markets are becoming winner-takes-all for two reasons: product differentiation is not very relevant to carve out market niches and indirect network effects are particularly strong in ride-hailing apps, especially because they are enhanced by the user ?data snowball effect? to a larger extent than in other digital platforms. We provide an empirical corroboration of these findings that builds on available data from the main cities of the United States. After defining the relevant market of ride-hailing platforms, we compare the existent data to show that, as expected in winner-takes-all markets, the market shares of a single firm (Uber) have been increasing to the detriment of its competitors?. Finally, we show that Uber?s strategy to conquer these markets seems to be based on predatory pricing and we suggest three ways in which Uber might recoup its losses from predation.? Keywords: multisided platforms; ride-hailing; winner-takes-all; Uber; sharing economy; antitrust; predatory pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:reidbu:rei_162_0043 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Revue d'économie industrielle from De Boeck Université |
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