‪L’inefficience des partenariats public-privé appliqués aux prisons françaises‪

Éric Rigamonti and Isabelle Leroux

Revue d'économie industrielle, 2018, vol. n° 162, issue 2, 99-125

Abstract: ?On the basis of task bundling and on a private ownership of equipment, public-private partnerships (PPP) should be more efficient than public procurement (PuP). However, some French PPPs do not produce this extra-efficiency. This is particularly the case of newly-created French prisons. In continuation of the literature on PPPs, we study this case of prison construction in order to clarify the reasons for this PPP inefficiency. Thus, we highlight how the transition from a PuP to a PPP can lead to an oligopoly that generates a rent in a low competitive environment. We also highlight the fact that the partnership consortium is imperfect and does not generate the expected incentive system.?

Keywords: public-private partnership; bundling; incitation; oligopoly; consortium; prison; construction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=REI_162_0099 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-industrielle-2018-2-page-99.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:reidbu:rei_162_0099

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue d'économie industrielle from De Boeck Université
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().