Réforme du contrôle des concentrations en Europe et demandes de renvoi: vers une sectorisation ?

Benoît Berquier

Revue d'économie industrielle, 2020, vol. n° 170, issue 2, 9-48

Abstract: In 2004, the introduction of new rules governing merger control in the European Union by the European Commission radically changed the system for referral of merger projects by making it more flexible. Faced with the increase in the number of referral requests following this reform, it appears necessary to identify the typology of these projects. This article contributes to their analysis by focusing on the effects of the reform on the determinants of requests for referrals to national competition authorities. It shows empirically that referral requests are more likely to occur when the project concerns certain sectors such as construction or wholesale, but also when the project risks an increase in the level of market concentration. JEL classification: C51, D02, K21, L4.

Keywords: European Union; competition; merger control; decentralization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C51 D02 K21 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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