Régulation multidimensionnelle d'un monopole polluant et majorité politique aléatoire

Hélène Boisson

Recherches économiques de Louvain, 2005, vol. 71, issue 3, 285-313

Abstract: We characterize the optimal regulation contract of a monopoly with two private information parameters of adverse selection (productivity and polluting emissions levels). In this bidimensional screening framework, we introduce a political economy approach, considering that the social objective of the regulator depends on the outcome of a majority vote. Two main types of contracts appear : the first is a separating one, the second is a pooling or bunching one. Their occurrence depends on the conflict between the private and social incentives, which are the result of the regulator?s trade-o. between informational rents extraction and allocative efficiency.

Date: 2005
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