Maintenance environnementale et politique fiscale optimale dans un modèle à générations imbriquées

Mouez Fodha

Recherches économiques de Louvain, 2005, vol. 71, issue 4, 413-425

Abstract: This article analyses instruments which are available to the government to correct environmental externalities. We assume that only the government has access to environmental maintenance activity, which is financed by levying taxes. The competitive equilibrium is therefore not optimal because the economy faces (i) a problem of public good supply, i.e. the maintenance activity, (ii) a pollution externality from private consumption, (iii) the selfishness of the short lived agents. We determine the optimal fiscal structure that allows the competitive equilibrium and the optimum to coincide. To determine the optimal level of environmental maintenance, we use the Samuelson rule, modified to take into account the relevant social rate of discount that incorporates the natural rate of depletion. We show that the considered optimal maintenance activity should not only neutralize the flow of emissions of pollutants but also increases the environmental quality. Otherwise, in the long run, the environmental amenities would disappear.

Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=REL_714_0413 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-recherches-economiques ... -2005-4-page-413.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
Working Paper: Maintenance environnementale et politique fiscale optimale dans un modèle à générations imbriquées (2005)
Working Paper: Maintenance environnementale et politique fiscale optimale dans un modèle à générations imbriquées (2005)
Working Paper: Maintenance environnementale et politique fiscale optimale dans un modèle à générations imbriquées (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:reldbu:rel_714_0413

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Recherches économiques de Louvain from De Boeck Université
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().