Un effet pervers de la responsabilité limitée

Sandrine Ollier

Recherches économiques de Louvain, 2006, vol. 72, issue 3, 265-286

Abstract: Although legal restrictions limiting the workers? liability are made to increase their welfare, we show that they may lead to a perverse effect when more productive workers cross subsidize less productive workers. A generalized agency model is analyzed and used to show that exonerating a wealthy agent from liability for damages caused during the execution of the contract decreases the more productive workers? expected utility in the pooling equilibrium of the combined model.

Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=REL_723_0265 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-recherches-economiques ... -2006-3-page-265.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:reldbu:rel_723_0265

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Recherches économiques de Louvain from De Boeck Université
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().