Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d'une asymétrie d'information sur l'aversion au risque des parties
Eric Langlais
Recherches économiques de Louvain, 2008, vol. 74, issue 2, 191-218
Abstract:
This paper studies in a model à la Bebchuk how the existence of an asymmetric information on the risk aversion of parties engaged in a trial affects the way they litigate. We first consider the situation where the plaintiff is the informed party, and solve for the equilibrium with and without pre-trial negotiations. Then, we analyze the comparative static of the model and the effects of alternative fee-shfting rules. Finally, we discuss several extensions: the case where the defendant is the informed party, the influence of the representation of litigants? preferences, and of the existence of the optimistic bias (or self-serving bias). JEL Classification: D81, K42.
Keywords: litigations; asymmetric information; bias in risk perception (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Related works:
Working Paper: Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d’une asymétrie d’information sur l’aversion au risque des parties (2008) 
Working Paper: Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d'une asymétrie d'informaion sur l'aversion au risque des parties (2006) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:reldbu:rel_742_0191
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