Lobbying for carbon permits in Europe

Julien Hanoteau

Recherches économiques de Louvain, 2014, vol. 80, issue 1, 61-87

Abstract: Using cross-sector and cross-country data, this paper evidences that rent seeking influenced the allocation of CO 2 emission permits in the two first phases of the European emissions trading scheme. Industry lobbies effectively used the ?job loss? and ?competitiveness? arguments, as unemployment proxy variables significantly impacted the allocation in both phases, and carbon intensity influenced it in the second phase. The countries that adopted a partial auction scheme also gave relatively more permits and in particular to the politically more powerful sectors. This suggests a compensation mechanism and supports the assumption of a political tradeoff between the quantity of permits issued and the decision between free grant and auction. It also confirms that the initial allocation is not neutral in the presence of special interest lobbying. JEL Classification: D72, Q58, C10.

Keywords: Lobbying; emissions trading; permits allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C10 D72 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Lobbying for carbon permits in Europe (2014)
Working Paper: Lobbying for carbon permits in Europe (2014)
Working Paper: Lobbying for carbon permits in Europe (2014)
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