Une étude expérimentale de la forte stabilité

Abdoul Ndiaye

Recherches économiques de Louvain, 2014, vol. 80, issue 1, 89-103

Abstract: In this paper, we study the strong candidate stability of a voting procedure as defined by Dutta et al. [2001] through the experimental method. In this sense, a voting rule is said to be strongly candidate stable if the winner of the election remains unchanged after an attempted manipulation by strategic candidacy of a potential candidate. In an election with three candidates and a small electorate, we evaluate experimentally frequencies of the strong candidate stability of parliamentary voting rules and plurality. JEL Classification: D71.

Keywords: strategic candidacy; strong candidate stability; experimental method; frequencies; parliamentary voting rules; plurality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Working Paper: Une étude expérimentale de la forte stabilité (2014)
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