La sécurité de l'approvisionnement électrique. Quels enjeux pour la régulation ?

Frédéric Marty

Revue de l'OFCE, 2007, vol. 101, issue 2, 421-452

Abstract: The volatility in electricity markets disrupts price signals for investors and could induce an insufficient level of generating capacity. The risks are all the more significant since the profitability of peak-load capacities is especially sensitive to the level of prices that are realised during the small number of hours in which they produce energy. But, the difficulty to balance between scarcity rents and abuses of market power could induce regulatory interventions as too stringent price-caps. These ones could make worse the spontaneous market under-investment. They restrict the scarcity rents expected by the investors and reinforce the law uncertainty. Our purpose is to analyse the mechanisms which are used to provide an optimal level of generating capacity, as capacity obligations, payments or markets, and to underline the complementarities between decentralised investment decisions and public action. JEL codes: K23, L43, L94.

JEL-codes: K23 L43 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=REOF_101_0421 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-de-l-ofce-2007-2-page-421.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
Working Paper: La securité de l'approvisionnement électrique: quels enjeux pour la régulation ? (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:reofsp:reof_101_0421

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue de l'OFCE from Presses de Sciences-Po
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().