Le contrat unique. Une auberge espagnole

Jacques Barthelemy and Gilbert Cette

Revue de l'OFCE, 2016, vol. N° 146, issue 2, 43-65

Abstract: The proposal of a single contract often stems from the fact that labour market duality is observed, with, on the one hand, highly protected employees (i.e. those with permanent contracts and civil servants) and, on the other, those alternating between badly protected insecure jobs and periods of unemployment. But the concept of this ?single contract? is often poorly defined. Its three stated objectives are to: (i) reduce status inequalities arising from the coexistence of permanent contracts and ?insecure? contracts (fixed-term and temporary); (ii) reduce the costly uncertainty and complexity of dismissal laws; (iii) partly internalise the social costs of dismissals. Our analysis shows that a single contract cannot truly meet these objectives, which could be better addressed in other ways, and that it would entail considerable legal risks. Codes JEL : J41 ; J52 ; J53 ; K31

Keywords: structural reforms; labor market; labor code; collective bargaining; unions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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