La réforme italienne des retraites. Ombres et lumières d’un parcours d’obstacles

Elsa Fornero

Revue de l'OFCE, 2020, vol. N° 170, issue 6, 59-84

Abstract: This article looks back at the genesis and political trajectory of Italy?s so-called Monti-Fornero pension reform. The reform, which is still in place, was drafted and adopted in less than forty days in 2011 at a time of international pressure on the country?s public finances. The reform actually had its origins in 1992 under the Amato government, which took steps to control the level of pensions by indexing them to prices instead of wages. An ambitious reform was then launched in 1995, under the Dini government, that aimed at gradually transforming a pension system based on the principle of defined benefits into a defined contribution system. This reform, which was to give rise to an Italian-style system of notional accounts, had the significant drawback of being implemented very slowly. After Italy was hit by the financial crisis of 2009 and the sovereign debt crisis, it was forced to appeal for European support in 2011. This support was obtained in return for ambitious reforms. It was in this context that the Monti-Fornero reform was passed, with the main measures being an acceleration of the Dini reform agenda and a significant rise in the minimum retirement age. Although the reform was transparent and financially sustainable and therefore capable of restoring confidence in the level of future pensions, it was nevertheless unpopular. Since the end of the Monti government, Italy?s political parties, including those that had supported the reform, have tended to distance themselves from the measure or even to oppose it quite fiercely. The Northern League in particular has made its opposition an electoral battle-cry. Yet the League?s entry into the government in 2018 did not see any fundamental change in the reform but only some provisional measures easing it. The story of Italy illustrates the political and social difficulty of adopting a pension reform in haste when it would have been better to act earlier when the fragility of the financial accounts had long been known.

Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=REOF_170_0059 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-de-l-ofce-2020-6-page-59.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:reofsp:reof_170_0059

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue de l'OFCE from Presses de Sciences-Po
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().