Jeu de l'investissement et coordination par les intentions. Des résultats expérimentaux

Claude Meidinger, Stéphane Robin () and Bernard Ruffieux

Revue d'économie politique, 2001, vol. 111, issue 1, 67-93

Abstract: This paper presents some experimental results that focus on players? coordination on Pareto-optimal issues of the investment game. These results show the importance of communication of intentions as a mean to realize such a coordination in different contexts (simultaneous or sequential game, with or without cheap talk, repeated game with or without a mediator).

Keywords: experimental economic; game; coordination; reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Working Paper: Jeu de l'investissement et coordination par les intentions: des resultats experimentaux (2000)
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