Chômage d'équilibre et défauts de coordination dans un modèle de prospection monétaire
Revue d'économie politique, 2001, vol. 111, issue 3, 439-458
In this paper, we consider unemployment equilibria as the result of coordination failures problems. The existence of coordination failures is here based on the realisation of decentralised exchanges. We propose then to investigate the links between the realisation of exchanges and the determination of activity and employment levels. Hence, we then consider an extension of the Kiyotaki and Wright?s model . The modification is not the technology of transactions which exhibits again constant returns to scale but the producers? plan who becomes a searcher of employment. In this purpose, we integrate his decision to produce. In this model, there exist multiple Pareto-ranked steady states rational expectations equilibria with natural rates of unemployment. We show a positive relationship between the probability of acceptation of money and the incentive to produce. Classification JEL?: E00, D83, E52
Keywords: unemployment equilibrium; coordination failures; monetary trades (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E00 D83 E52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_113_0439
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