Substitution des monnaies et cours légal

Sébastien Lotz and Guillaume Rocheteau

Revue d'économie politique, 2001, vol. 111, issue 3, 459-480

Abstract: This article addresses the difficulty introducing a new currency into a domestic economy. The aim is to study how a government can influence private agents in their decision to accept, or reject a new fiat currency. Different historical examples teach us that some conditions must be fulfilled for this type of monetary reform to be successful. In order to illustrate and confirm these results, we extend the search theoretical model of Kiyotaki and Wright [1993] by introducing two types of currency. We show that the legal or "illegal" tender of the old currency, and the quantity in the economy play an important role in the success of launching the new currency. We ultimately present simulations of the dynamics of the model. Classification JEL : E00, D83, E52

Keywords: currency; legal tender (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 E00 E52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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