L'union monétaire européenne: faut-il avoir peur du passager clandestin ?

Hélène Lenoble-Liaud

Revue d'économie politique, 2001, vol. 111, issue 6, 861-884

Abstract: When countries decide to coordinate and form a coalition, an outsider country can take advantage of the situation and gain more than an insider, hence creating a free-rider problem that could threaten the stability of the coalition. But as far as the Euro zone is concerned, the emphasis put on the problem seems exaggerated, especially when one considers the behaviour of the potential outsiders and their urge to fulfil the Maastricht criteria. We therefore wanted to rethink the question with a simple three-country neo-keynesian model. With the help of game theory?s results, we show that the comparison of outsiders and insiders?gains is irrelevant. But in case of specific shocks or when countries are assumed to be different, other types of free-rider problem can occur, which can preclude coordination.

Keywords: coordination; macroeconomic policies; free-riding; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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