Hétérogénéité des établissements de santé et tarification à la pathologie

Philippe Choné and Romain Lesur

Revue d'économie politique, 2002, vol. 112, issue 1, 65-76

Abstract: We reexamine the mechanism of prospective reimbursement when the regulator does not observe hospitals? cost characteristics, which can depend on exogenous variables and idiosyncratic shocks. In this framework, we formally develop the "reduced-form" of yardstick competition, which allows the regulator to reduce her informational disadvantage by "filtering out" the effect of the exogenous variables in the case of a fixed number of patients. This result does not hold in more complex environments, in particular when the number of patients is variable. However, we show that adjustments of prospective reimbursements are necessary. Classification JEL : L51, I18

Keywords: yardstick competition; cost regression on observable variables; informational asymmetry; adverse selection; unobserved heterogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I18 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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