Que peut bien apporter l'analyse économique à l'application du droit de la concurrence ?

Thierry Pénard and Saïd Souam ()

Revue d'économie politique, 2002, vol. 112, issue 6, 863-887

Abstract: The aim of this article is to convince that economic tools are useful and relevant to analyze antitrust policy. More precisely, we show that the economics of antitrust enforcement provides a helpful framework to address fundamental practical questions : How to efficiently enforce antitrust laws, under different constraints, like budget constraints or information asymmetry ? How to articulate ex ante and ex post monitoring? Which kind of mechanisms should antitrust authorities implement? This article presents and discusses the main models and results of this recent strand of the economic literature, focusing on price-fixing agreements and mergers. Classification JEL : K21, L41

Keywords: antitrust law; antitrust enforcement; ex ante and ex post monitoring; mergers; cartel (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Working Paper: Que peut bien apporter l'analyse économique à l'application du droit de la concurrence ? (2002)
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