Théorie du droit français des entreprises en difficulté. Conciliation, liquidation et jeux

Regis Deloche () and Fabienne Oguer

Revue d'économie politique, 2002, vol. 112, issue 6, 889-904

Abstract: Present French bankruptcy law is composed of extra-judicial (prevention and mediation) treatment of firms? difficulties and judicial treatment (bankruptcy reorganization and liquidation) of their failures. In the first part, mediation belongs to non-cooperative game theory and to economics of information. In the second part, liquidation belongs to axiomatic sharing theory and to cooperative game theory. We give a case study that enables to characterize, on the one hand, the mediator?s part in the negotiation between a firm and its chief creditors and, on the other hand, the method used in France to share the liquidation value of a bankrupt firm between its creditors. Classification JEL: K4, C7, D6

Keywords: bankruptcy; negotiation; sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D6 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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