Dissuasion du crime et concurrence entre juridictions

Nicolas Marceau and Steeve Mongrain

Revue d'économie politique, 2002, vol. 112, issue 6, 905-919

Abstract: This paper studies competition in of crime deterrence between jurisdictions. It considers a world such that criminals can chose the jurisdiction in which they operate. To protect its allocation, every jurisdiction invests in deterrence to reduce benefits of criminal benefits on its territory and to incite criminals to locate in another jurisdiction. We characterize the different equilibria, symetric and asymetric, which can appear in such a world. We demonstrate that when there is no cooperation between jurisdictions, the only possible efficient equilibria are asymmetric. Classification du JEL: K42

Keywords: interjurisdictional competition; crime; deterrence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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