Les relations de mandat dans les systèmes constitutionnels. Approche théorique et application au cas européen

Jean-Michel Josselin and Alain Marciano

Revue d'économie politique, 2002, vol. 112, issue 6, 921-942

Abstract: In this paper, an agency model is proposed, which allows us not only to compare a unitary state with a federation but also to represent the various forms of federalism. The concept of subsidiarity is used to explain how responsibilities are assigned between the different institutional levels. Then, the theoretical framework is used to investigate the present institutional status of the European union. We show that Europe still hesitates between a confederation and a federation, two types of subsidiarity (lateral or upwards) being respectively applied. Classification JEL : D72, H11, K10

Keywords: federalism; subsidiarity; constitutions; agency theory; production of law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H11 K10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Working Paper: Les relations de mandat dans les systèmes contitutionnels: approche théorique et application au cas européen (2002)
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