La répression des pratiques délictueuses des dirigeants le rôle des actionnaires

Christian At and Nathalie Chappe

Revue d'économie politique, 2004, vol. 114, issue 1, 99-110

Abstract: We present a model of an entrepreneur diverting some of the profits of the firm. Two types of sanctions are taken into account. First, criminal law defines a fine that the entrepreneur must pay to the authority. Second, civil law requires that the wronged agents who have suffered loses obtain compensation. We focus on the role of outside shareholders in suing the entrepreneur. We show that the first type of sanction does always not insure a decrease of diverted profits. So, the outside shareholders role should be privilegied.

Keywords: Relation manager; shareholders; law and economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Working Paper: La répression des pratiques délictueuses des dirigeants: le rôle des actionnaires (2004)
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