Nash: changement de programme ?

Benoît Lengaigne

Revue d'économie politique, 2004, vol. 114, issue 5, 637-662

Abstract: With Nash?s program, contemporary game theory appears like an homogeneous sub-ject based on individual strategic rationality. Cooperative and non cooperative approaches complement one another and request only one model of player. Historically, Nash?s program refers to the bargaining problem (Nash [1950a, 1953]). It supposes a definite interpretation of Nash?s first article: the axiomatic process of ?The Bargaining Problem? lacks foundations and has to be completed by a non cooperative approach. An other view on this article is possible, it stresses on the ambitions of players to reach an equitable issue. It leads to the definition of a new alternative research program and involves an heterogeneous conception of game theory. Two models of player are necessary to cover the field of the two branches ? cooperative and non cooperative? of the subject.

Keywords: cooperation; game theory; fairness; player; nash (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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