Responsabilité, délégation, concurrence l'efficacité des organisations et des institutions

Marcel Boyer

Revue d'économie politique, 2005, vol. 115, issue 3, 285-308

Abstract: Jean-Jacques Laffont made numerous contributions to the study of the relative efficiency of organizations and institutions responsible for developing and implementing public policy reforms. In this endeavour, he continuously and repeatedly showed very high levels of determination and care to properly define and characterize the relevant institutional frameworks or instruments to be compared. This paper deals with three such analyses from Boyer and Laffont [1997,1999,2003]: the properties of efficient extended liability rules for environmental protection, the efficient emergence of incentive regulation as a policy implementation instrument in a constitutional political economy framework, and the impact of the development of competitive pressures on the intensity of incentives in the public regulated sector.

Keywords: incentives; institutions; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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