Economic Policy in the Presence of Coordination Problems

Russell W. Cooper

Revue d'économie politique, 2005, vol. 115, issue 4, 379-390

Abstract: This paper discusses the conduct of government policy in coordination games. In economic situations with multiple equilibria, government intervention may be valuable to overcome coordination problems and to internalize externalities. Yet, the design of optimal interventions is made more difficult by the presence of strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria.

Keywords: coordination games; economic policy; multiple equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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