Deux prix Nobel pour la théorie des jeux

Christian Schmidt

Revue d'économie politique, 2006, vol. 116, issue 2, 133-145

Abstract: The paper is a survey of the Aumann?s and Schelling?s main contributions to game theory. For Aumann, a distinction is made between his works devoted to cooperative and non cooperative games. As for Schelling, pure coordination games and focal points are underlined on one hand, and the collective impact of interdependance strategic expectations, on the other hand. In conclusion, the paper shows the existence of a profound, but partially hidden, link between Aumann?s and Schelling?s researches concerning the players? beliefs and the cognitive approach of a game situation.

Keywords: Aumann; Schelling; continuum of players; coalition structures; correlated equilibrium; pure coordination game; focal points; cognitive rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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