L'indemnisation du chômage: au-delà d'une conception « désincitative »

Yann Algan, Pierre Cahuc, Bruno Decreuse, Francois Fontaine and Solenne Tanguy ()

Revue d'économie politique, 2006, vol. 116, issue 3, 297-326

Abstract: Unemployment compensation schemes have two goals: insuring against the risk of unemployment on the one hand, and financing job search on the other hand. During the past decades, the literature has mainly focused on the first goal, highlighting the moral hazard effects originated by unemployment benefits. However, several contributions, both empirical and theoretical, suggest unemployment compensation may also improve labour market efficiency, by alleviating the financial constraints that affect the job-seekers, helping to select the efficient search channel, or favoring the creation of high quality jobs. The present paper offers a synthesis of this literature in the paradigm of sequential job search theory.

Keywords: unemployment benefits; credit constraints; search channels; wage distribution; job quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=REDP_163_0297 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique-2006-3-page-297.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_163_0297

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue d'économie politique from Dalloz
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().