Le rôle des garanties dans les prêts des banques françaises

Régis Blazy and Laurent Weill

Revue d'économie politique, 2006, vol. 116, issue 4, 501-522

Abstract: This paper provides new empirical evidence on the reasons why French banks use collateral. We test the relevance of the reduction of loan loss in the event of default and the resolution of adverse selection problems as satisfactory reasons for this use. We use a dataset of 564 bank loans on French firms, which contains the full information on type and value of collaterals. We then show that collateral reduces loan loss in the event of default with major differences between collaterals in terms of magnitude of the reduction. Furthermore our results reject the view that collateral would help to solve adverse selection problems.

Keywords: bank; collateral; information asymmetries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=REDP_164_0501 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique-2006-4-page-501.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_164_0501

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue d'économie politique from Dalloz
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().