Projets en PPP, contrainte budgétaire et choix des investissements

Rémy Prud’homme and Pierre-Alexandre Kopp

Revue d'économie politique, 2006, vol. 116, issue 5, 601-611

Abstract: The VAN criteria constitute the criterium of choice for public investment. Some projects are subject to partnerships between the public and private sectors (PPP). The financing is then mixed; public subsidy and private investment. In the presence of budgetary constraints, how to select the right group of projects from amongst all the projects? The recent Lebègue (2005) report suggests using as the selection criteria, not the greatest benefit produced by an investment but the benefit per public euro spent. We contest this approach which considers only the profitability of public capital and not the total of mobilised resources. We test the classic procedure against the Lebègue procedure in the case of the choice of the 17 autoroute projects proposed for PPP financing in 2005. The Lebègue procedure leads to recommending that the state invest in more projects than the classic procedure does, thus creating a serious misallocation of resources.

Keywords: PPP; IRR (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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