Jeux évolutionnistes, processus d'apprentissage et équilibres stochastiques une application à l'économie des conventions chez Hayek

Thierry Aimar and Francis Bismans

Revue d'économie politique, 2006, vol. 116, issue 5, 633-656

Abstract: This article deals with the genesis and dynamics of conventions in Hayek. It uses the theory of evolutionary games to develop a general model of learning by the agents. It also aims at giving an economic interpretation of the process by which the norms are generated and selected.

Keywords: austrian school of economics; conventions; evolutionary games; Hayek; institutions; learning; stochastically stable equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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