La phase III du système communautaire d'échange de quotas d'émission: Comment attribuer les permis ?

Michel Mougeot and Florence Naegelen

Revue d'économie politique, 2009, vol. 119, issue 2, 165-184

Abstract: The European commission?s proposal on the EU-ETS states that auctioning will be the main method for the allocation of E. U. allowances. This article compares auctioning of carbon permit pollution with grandfathering and analyzes different auction rules in the context of multi-unit demands to allocate permits. As there is analytically no clear ranking of the procedures, experimental studies can be useful. If selecting a uniform auction seems reasonable, the choice between a close and an open format should be the result of a trade-off between arguments about collusion stability and price discovery.

Keywords: Pollution permits; EU-ETS; Auctioning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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