L'Ambiguïté en Économie Politique

Morgane Tanvé

Revue d'économie politique, 2009, vol. 119, issue 2, 185-219

Abstract: This paper investigates the concept of strategic ambiguity conceived as candidates? intentional communicational behaviour in an electoral process. Strategic ambiguity has two distinct meanings in political economics : first, it may refer to ambivalence which is formalised by using lotteries and mixed strategies, second, to dissimulation which is formalised with intervals. We analyse these conceptions and discuss conditions under which candidates rely on strategic ambiguity in equilibrium. These conditions depending on the profile of preferences of voters, we focus on others underlying motivations a candidate has to resort to ambiguity. We then analyse the communication process between candidates and voters as games of imperfect information. We thus highlight origins of a preference for ambiguity both by candidates or voters.

Keywords: Political Ambiguity; Campaign Strategy; Electoral Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=REDP_192_0185 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique-2009-2-page-185.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_192_0185

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue d'économie politique from Dalloz
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().