Régulation optimale et éthique des biens dans un duopole Nord-Sud

Jean-Marie Cardebat () and Patrice Cassagnard

Revue d'économie politique, 2009, vol. 119, issue 2, 247-271

Abstract: This text develops a duopolistic North/South model where both firms compete in price. The good from the South is assumed to be ethically unsound (i.e. dubious social content) while those from the North ethically sound. We then study the consequences of monitoring ethics depending on the aims of the authority, the ethical requirements of the country and the confidence of the Northern consumers in the social quality of the Southern goods. It emerges strong convergences of interest between the Northern consumers and the Southern firm. These convergences correspond to the situation where the production of the Southern firm ethically sound and revealed (by monitoring). The interests of the Northern firm can be very different since the situation of lie controlled of the production of the South implies a quasi-monopoly of the Northern firm.

Keywords: Social quality; Ethics; Regulation; Nord-South Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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