Marginalisme et valeur de Shapley

Amandine Ghintran

Revue d'économie politique, 2011, vol. 121, issue 2, 155-177

Abstract: We survey axiomatic results concerning the Shapley value [Shapley, 1953]. This marginalist allocation rule results from an axiomatic study of the class of coalitional games. Several authors have enriched Shapley?s axiomatic study and have provided new characterizations of this allocation rule. The aim of this article is to put into perspective these characterizations. We highlight the logical relations among the axioms. Moreover, we show how the marginalist criterion is progressively introduced into the axiomatic.

Keywords: Shapley value; axiomatic study; marginalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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