La théorie des tournois appliquée aux joueurs de tennis professionnels: peut-on encore parler d'incitations à la performance ?

Eric Barget, Matthieu Llorca () and Thierry Teste

Revue d'économie politique, 2011, vol. 121, issue 3, 347-370

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to apply the tournament theory on professional male tennis players. Two new performance indicators are introduced, to take into account the opponent level. Empirical tests are conducted, by using the Ordinary Least Squares method, on the whole tournaments played by the best ATP 30 players, over the season 2007. Econometric results confirm the tournament theory incentive effect, namely, an undistributed prize structure between tournament levels, increase the player performance. However, the participative effect is rejected: the overall tournament prize money does not induce better player performance.

Keywords: tournament theory; incentives; performance; prize money; tennis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Working Paper: La théorie des tournois appliquée aux joueurs de tennis professionnels: peut-on encore parler d’incitations à la performance ? (2011)
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